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Religions 
 
Marat Shterin, King’s College London, marat.shterin@kcl.ac.uk 
Dmitry Dubrovsky, Higher School of Economics (Moscow), dmitry.dubrovsky@gmail.com 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article contributes to the growing body of research on the increasing role of judicial 
systems in regulating politics and religion (‘judicalization of politics and religion’) across the 
globe. By examining how academic expertise is deployed in anti-extremist litigation 
involving Russia’s minority religions, this article reveals important processes involved in this 
judicial regulation, in particular when legal and academic institutions lack autonomy and 
consistency of operation.  It focuses on the selection of experts and the validation of their 
opinion within Russia’s academia and the judiciary, and identifies patterns in the experts’ 
approach to evidence and how they validate their conclusions in the eyes of the judiciary.  
Academic expertise provides an aura of legitimacy to judicial decisions in which anti-
extremist legislation is used as a means to control unpopular minority religions and to 
regulate Russia’s religious diversity.  As one of the few systematic explorations of this 
subject and the first focused on Russia, this article reveals important processes that produce 
religious discrimination and the role that anti-extremist legislation plays in these processes.  
 





For those who in the 1990s had high expectations for religious freedom in Russia or 
indeed for Russian democracy in general, its subsequent trajectory may look vagarious at the 
very least.1  Within less than three decades a country with seemingly thriving religious 
freedom and mushrooming religious creativity has steadily become one where a host of 
restrictive laws and regulations serve as barriers to the enjoyment of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights and liberties.2 In addition, arbitrary administrative decisions are almost 
routinely used to restrict or altogether curtail proliferation of thousands of religious books, 
practices, and entire movements.3  All these developments have taken place within the 
context of the changing political landscape in Russia, in particular the establishment and 
consolidation of the regime of “personified power” during Vladimir Putin’s third presidency 
(2013 – 2018)4.    
 It is widely recognized that anti-extremism legislation has played a pivotal role in 
giving a semblance of legality to these developments and, more widely, in creating a new 
political or even philosophical climate in society.5 With its emphasis on immediate and 
palpable external and internal threats to national security, public order, safety, and well-
being, anti-extremism laws and associated regulations have served to construct and solidify 
“us vs. them” divisions in public imagination and perception, and related notions of 
                                                 
1 Derek H. Davis “Russia's New Law on Religion: Progress or Regress?,” Journal of Church and State 39, no. 4 
(1997): 645-55; and Cole W. Durham and  Lauren B. Homer, “Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience 
and Religious Associations,: analytical appraisal,” Emory Law Review, no 12 (1998): 101-246.  
2 Zoe Knox “Religious Freedom in Russia: Putin Years”, in Mark Steinberg and Catherine Wanner (eds.) 
Religion, Morality and Community in Post-Soviet Societies (Boomington: Indiana University Press, 2009): 281-
314; and Geraldine Fagan, Believing in Russia: Religious Policy after Communism (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 6-24, 155-71. 
3 Mariia Kravchenko, “Inappropriate Enforcement of Anti-Extremist Legislation in Russia in 2017,” ed. 
Aleksander Verkhovskii, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, April 24, 2018 <https://www.sova-
center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2018/04/d39253/>. 
4 Samuel Greene, Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s Russia (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2014) 
5 Gleb Bogush, “Criminalisation of Free Speech in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 69, no. 8 (2017): 1242-56. 
 
 3 
morality/immorality, permission/prohibition, and acceptance/rejection. The escalation of the 
anti-extremism legislative flurry between 2013 and 2017 and the increasing audibility and 
visibility of the tropes and concepts associated with the ideas of “Russian civilization” or the 
“Russian world” and of the associated notions of “traditional” and “non-traditional” were 
hardly coincidental.  In fact, these tropes and concepts came to be seen as a body of 
legitimate knowledge drawn on from certain experts and accepted by the judiciary.  This kind 
of relationship between the experts and judiciary can be seen as an expression of 
“epistemological affinity” and an act of “epistemological collaboration.” This formulation 
helps to avoid making assumptions as to whether both the experts and the judiciary actually 
“believed” in their actions or were sincere in regard to the claims and decisions they made 
about minority religions.  Indeed, in certain cases, these claims and decisions were quite 
unbelievable.  The question at the center of this article is why both experts and the judiciary 
assumed that such claims would be seen as legitimate knowledge that would be virtually 
unchallenged within the legal system and the wider society. 
 The introduction of anti-extremism legislation can be seen as an attempt to legitimize 
the return to the style and structure of governance that is more consistent with the country’s 
historical legacy of authoritarianism, state dominance over civil society, and political control 
of the legal system.  This also includes selective and biased deployment of academic experts 
by state-dependent judiciary.  However, while it would be unreasonable to discount the link 
between the country’s historical roots and the routes of social and political change, a hard 
version of “path dependency” approach can take us too far along the road of determinism in 
explaining the current predicament caused by the anti-extremism legislation for minority 
religions and the role of academic expertise in this.6   
                                                 
6 Stefan Hedlund, Russian Path Dependence: a People with a Troubled History (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004)  
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Thus, this article considers the effects of Soviet religious policies, “scientific 
atheism,” and the legal treatment of religious dissidents alongside the complexities and even 
paradoxes of the contemporary situation.  One fundamental paradox should not escape 
attention.  On a number of significant factors, and for all of its institutional deficiencies, 
Russia is a modern society, with democratic constitutional arrangements, a legal system, 
advanced academic institutions, and a thriving cultural life and aspirations. In fact, 
deployment of academic knowledge in legal decision-making is a profoundly modern 
phenomenon and the centrality of academic expertise in anti-extremism cases involving 
minority religions testifies to the modern nature of the Russian judicial system.7  However, 
academic expertise in these cases is often used to subvert the proper functioning of the 
modern judicial processes.  In this sense, this article reveals significant problems in the 
operation of Russia’s modern institutions, in particular its academic and legal system.  
 Taking a broader view, a body of research shows an increasing role of law courts in 
regulating social relations, including those involving religion, in contemporary societies.8  
Furthermore, this regulation can both protect and restrict human freedom; thus, with in his 
recent analysis Damon Mayrl points out that the increasing use of law courts in resolving 
disputes involving religion does not necessary serve to expand religious freedom.9  This 
article illustrates this point by focusing on the operation of Russia’s legal system in cases 
involving minority religions.   
The Russian judiciary is also not unique in having difficulties in understanding and 
adjudicating on minority religious groups, including deployment of academic expertise in 
                                                 
7 Donald Black, The Behavior of Law (New York: Academic Press, 1993), and Pamela J. Jenkins and Steven 
Kroll-Smith, Witnessing for Sociology (Westport: Praeger, 1996). 
8 Alec Stone Sweet “Judicialization and the Construction of Governance,” Comparative Political Studies, no 
32(2) (1999): 147–184; and James T. Richardson, Regulating Religion: Case Studies from Around the Globe 
(New York: Kluwer, 2004) 
9 Damon Mayrl “The Judicialization of Religious Freedom: An Institutionalist Approach,” Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion, no 57 (2018): 514-530.  
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cases related to them.10 In some sense, the treatment of minority religions brings into sharp 
relief the degree of autonomy of the legal system and its ability to withstand public, including 
political, pressures in adjudicating according to its procedures and the rules of evidence. 
Equally, it points to the significance of academic expertise in these cases, as scientific 
research is often the only way for the judiciary to obtain valid evidence on and understand the 
social reality of minority religious groups.11 This raises the question of what constitutes 
academic expertise in these specific areas and how it is validated, as well as of the extent to 
which the independence of the academic expert is implicated in the autonomy of the entire 
legal system.12  Thus, in litigation involving minority religions, academic experts often carry 
the burden of preserving the system’s integrity, as they find themselves in a unique position 
to tell unpalatable (to the general public) truths about unpopular groups, which can be at odds 
with the public’s, including judiciary’s, entrenched views.  Conversely, unwittingly or by 
choice academic experts can also go along with popular views or collaborate with politically 
influential groups, thus subverting the unique role that they and the legal system are supposed 
to play in delivering justice to minority religious groups.  
 
The Soviet Legacy: Religion, Academia, and Law Courts  
 
Contemporary scholarship is increasingly conscious of the many complexities and 
unintended effects of the Soviet state-imposed secularism and “scientific atheism.”  While the 
implications for both religious institutions and for those who aimed to eliminate religion as a 
precondition for ushering in the communist modernity have been comprehensively described 
and analysed, the anthropological effects of the Soviet modernizing project are much less 
                                                 
10 James T. Richardson and Francois Bellanger, eds., Legal Cases, New Religious Movements and Minority 
Faiths (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014). 
11 Eileen Barker "The Scientific Study of Religion? You Must Be Joking!," Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion no 34/3 (1995): 287-310 
12 Black, Behavior of Law; and Richardson, Regulating Religion 
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understood.13 In the mid-1970s prominent Soviet scientific atheist Dmitrii Ugrinovich still 
felt in a position to formulate the main goal of the study of religion in the USSR as the 
“demolition of religion on the basis of scientific knowledge,” but already some of his atheist 
colleagues were steadily turning toward social science to understand why Soviet policies had 
failed to achieve the goal of eliminating religion.14 In her excellent study of the history of 
Soviet atheism, Victoria Smolkin points to the unintended effects of Soviet scholars’ 
ethnographic engagements:  
 
Their experiences in the field showed them that religion was not just about “belief” 
but also about practice, emotion, community, and experience. Setting out to overcome 
a religion that was believed, atheists run up against a religion that was lived. And the 
problem with lived religion was that it was a world distinct, if not apart, from 
religious dogma and institutions.15 
 
Sonja Luehrmann comes to very similar conclusions in her anthropological work on the 
Soviet scholarship on religion. She points to a chain of paradoxes whereby Soviet scholars, 
motivated by the official ideological goal of achieving comprehensive secularization of 
society and individual consciousness, engaged in empirical research and discovered persistent 
and multifaceted religious practice. Baffled by this apparent contradiction to the official 
Marxist-Leninist “scientific” predictions, some scholars refined their methodological tools in 
order to offer more sophisticated explanations for their ethnographic observations and 
quantitative data. To put this differently, whereas the official scientific atheism insisted on 
                                                 
13 Fagan 2013, and Victoria Smolkin, A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: A History of Soviet Atheism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2018). 
14 Dmitry Ugrinovich, Vvedenie v teoreticheskoe religiovedenie (Moscow: Nauka, 1973): 85. See also William 
C. Fletcher, “Soviet Sociology of Religion: An Appraisal,” Russian Review 35, no. 2 (1976): 173-91. 
15 Smolkin, Sacred Space is Never Empty, 162-63. 
 7 
the epiphenomenal nature of religion, more ethnographically inclined Soviet scholars 
grappled with having discovered thriving religious phenomena.16  
 Some have insisted that such Soviet scholarship should be considered as meeting 
western standards for academic religious studies or, as it also has been argued, the scientific 
standards for “pure anthropology.”17 This view is problematic, however, because while some 
Soviet atheist scholars’ findings were at odds with official claims and clichés about religion, 
they never challenged the Communist Party’s ideological line on inevitability of 
disappearance of religion following successes in eliminating its “material roots.”  Although 
empiricism took these Soviet scholars along the road of science, the ideological and 
bureaucratic constraints of obligatory scientific atheism limited their ability to interpret data 
as a way of testing original theories, which, according to Karl Popper, is the key criterion that 
distinguishes science from non-science.18  Soviet scientific atheists could be puzzled by their 
data, but they could not change their theories and challenge Marxism’s indubitable truths. 
 This situation led to a peculiar role of religious studies scholars, that is scientific 
atheists, as experts in legal cases related to religion.  As a purportedly modern and 
progressive state, the Soviet Union constitutionally guaranteed the freedom of religion and 
therefore religious practice per se could not be the subject of a legal trial.  In practice, 
religious believers were prosecuted not for believing or practicing their faith, but for “anti-
social practices” or  
“anti-state activities” conducted “under the guise of religion.”19 In these cases, the academic 
expert (i.e. the scientific atheist) was expected to provide evidence of the detrimental effects 
of these practices on Soviet citizens’ well-being or on society as a whole. Crucially, as his 
                                                 
16 Sonja Luerhmann, “Antagonistic Insights: Evolving Soviet Atheist Critiques of Religion and Why They 
Matter for Anthropology,”  Social Analysis 59, no. 2 (2015): 98-113. 
17 Marina Schakhnovich, “Peterburgskaia religiovedtcheskaia shkola: istoki i traditsii,” Vestnik rossiiskogo 
obshchestva prepodavatelei religii, no. 1 (2008): 26-33. 
18 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1963). 
19 Nathaniel Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2003), 11. 
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(invariably his at that time) evidence was assumed to be based on science and its 
incontrovertible conclusions, his testimony was seen as indubitable, too.  
  The Chronicle of Current Events (Khronika Tekushchikh Sobytii), a long-running 
samizdat periodical (1968 – 1983) that meticulously documented Soviet political trials, 
provides a wealth of material on the practical deployment of “scientific atheists” as experts 
producing incontrovertible proofs of religious dissenters’ criminality. Thus, Anatoly Levitin-
Krasnov’s trial (1971) featured testimony from Professor Mikhail Novikov, Head of the 
Department of Scientific Atheism at Moscow State University, and Boris Griogoryan, then 
deputy editor of the leading atheist magazine Science and Religion (Nauka i Religiia).20 
Through selective reading and an ideological slant, their testimonies construed Levitin-
Krasnov’s theological and philosophical treatise on religious freedom as political subversion 
and slander of the Soviet political system. Likewise, in the 1975 trial of Georgy Vins, the 
secretary of the Evangelical Christian Union, unnamed experts accused the defendant of  
“violating the Law on Freedom of Worship and Religious Organisations” and of  “anti-social 
statements.” Ironically, they also accused him of publicly “violating the Law on the 
Separation between Church and State and between School and Church” and of “infringement 
of citizens’ rights under the guise of conducting religious ceremonies.”21  
 In a nutshell, the Soviet legacy of the relationship between academic expertise and 
legal treatment of religion can be described as follows. While the knowledge of religion 
within the Soviet academia, in particular among scientific atheists, went well beyond the 
official ideological and political prescriptions, law courts used their expertise selectively with 
the purpose of providing proofs of state-imposed accusations. The official Soviet philosophy 
of science as uniquely capable of providing incontrovertible truth was congruent with the 
                                                 
20 “The Case of Levitin-Krasnov,” Chronicle of Current Events, August 31, 1970, available at 
https://chronicleofcurrentevents.net/2014/05/09/15-5-the-case-of-levitin-krasnov/. 
21 “The Trial of Georgy Vins,” Chronicle of Current Events, March 31, 1975, available at 
https://chronicleofcurrentevents.net/no-35-31-march-1975-2/.  
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state’s punitive approach to any ideological qua political dissent, which ruled out competition 
between experts and their versions of knowledge and truths. Seeing religion as 
epiphenomenal and as falsely reflecting social reality further facilitated the admissibility of 
academic expertise that ignored the complexity of religion and its reduction to subversive 
social practices and political views.  
 
The Making of the Post-Soviet Expert in Religion   
 
One definitive factor that shaped the role and profile of academic experts has been the 
evolution of the legislative framework since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This has 
included the introduction of the 1993 Constitution, specific legislation on religion, and laws 
that have influenced both the legal treatment of religious minorities and their perception by 
the general public. Considerable scholarship in this area and the meticulous monitoring of the 
state of religious freedom in post-Soviet Russia by human rights and religious freedom 
NGOs, both domestic and overseas, point to this evolution.22  While the provisions of the 
1990 Law on Freedom of Worship and the 1993 Constitution were informed by appreciation 
of religious freedom as a universal value and an inalienable individual right, the rationale for 
the subsequent legislative changes presumed the need to protect society and the individual 
from inevitable insecurities and threats inherent in the apparently open religious marketplace.   
 The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations can be seen as 
the first step toward introducing this legislative philosophy and legal provisions that reflected 
                                                 
22 Durham and Homer 1998; Marat Shterin and James Richardson,  “Effects of the Western Anti-Cult 
Movement on Development of Laws Concerning Religion in Post-Communist Russia”, Journal of Church and 
State, no 42 (2000): 247-72; Marat Shterin and James T. Richardson, “Local Laws Restricting Religion in 
Russia: Precursors of Russia’s New National Law,” in Religious Liberty in Northern Europe in the Twenty-First 
Century, ed. Derek H. Davis (Waco: J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, 2000); Knox 2009, and 
Fagan, Believing in Russia. For domestic monitoring organizations, see SOVA Center for Information and 
Analysis (https://www.sova-center.ru/). For international monitoring organizations, see Forum 18 News Service 
(http://www.forum18.org/). 
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it. Its preamble presumed the differential benevolence of religions, depending of their historic 
connections with the Russian nation and its constituent ethnic groups.23 While stopping short 
of formally using the concept of “traditional religion” as a judicial term to refer to more 
socially acceptable and legitimate faiths, the law effectively smuggled it into the public 
domain by pointing in its preamble to the historic contributions of Russian Orthodoxy, 
Christianity (listed separately), Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism and other religions of the 
“peoples of the Russian Federation” and by distinguishing between “religious organisations” 
and “religious groups.”  Whereas the former could enjoy the full rights of a legal entity, the 
latter were restricted to mainly private religious practice before they could provide proof of 
existence in Russia for at least fifteen years prior to their application for registration.  
Equally important, Article 14 of the law listed a number of grounds on which a 
religious association could be “liquidated,” such as “violation of public security and public 
order and damage to the security of the state,” “actions directed toward violent change of the 
bases of constitutional order and violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation,” 
“propaganda of war and incitement of social, racial, national, or religious discord,” 
“infringement of the rights and freedom of citizens”, “encouragement of suicide or refusal of 
medical care for religious motives,” “committing extremism activity,” and “damaging the 
morality and health of citizens”.24  
 A second significant factor shaped the role and profile of academic experts in cases 
involving minority religions: the proliferation, in the 1990s, of hundreds of new religious 
groups, both foreign and domestic, such as Unification Church, Church of Scientology, 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Church of the Last Testament, Mother of 
God Centre, and others.  Given that Western research on these groups was largely unknown 
                                                 
23 Marat Shterin, “Friends and foes of the ‘Russian World’: the Post-Soviet state’s Management of Religious 
Diversity,” in The Politics and Practice of Religious Diversity: National Contexts, Global Issues, ed. Andrew 
Dawson (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 29-48. 
24 “Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations,” English translation available at 
<https://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/freedomofconscienceeng.html.> 
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to wider audiences and domestic academic studies of them were in their infancy, an alliance 
of anticult groups and the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) 
dominated the public’s perception of these minority groups, in particular through their 
negative representations in the mass media.  
Drawing primarily on Western anticult sources and supported by Western anticult 
activists, this alliance was instrumental in popularizing the generalised threatening image of 
these groups as “destructive cults” and “totalitarian sects” and, ultimately, as proof of the 
need to protect society from the “excesses” of religious freedom.25 However, the demands for 
protection were also appeals for exclusive support by the state and its legal system of the 
Russian Orthodox Church’s claim to be the guardian of the nation’s moral and spiritual well-
being and to have exclusive influence on the state in these areas.  Even in heady post-Soviet 
days of religious freedom, the constitutional provisions did not prevent government agencies 
from using extralegal means to advocate anticult approaches to religious minorities and to 
warn society about these alleged threats, such as the 1996 letter of the Russian Ministry of 
Interior.26  
The constitutional provisions for religious freedom and democratic reforms of the 
legal system also made it possible for minority religions to contest negative public 
representations and attempts to curtail their activities through the law courts.  Their fortunes 
within the law courts varied considerably, but irrespective of the outcome, these cases 
involved a considerable measure of competition between plaintiffs and defendants and their 
deployment of academic experts.27 In one such case, Yakunin vs. Dvorkin, prominent human 
                                                 
25 Shterin and Richardson, “Local Laws Restricting Religion,” and Shterin, “Friends and Foes.”  
26 In this letter, entitled “Inquiry into the Activities of Certain Foreign Religious Organisations”, the Ministry 
warned about ‘the criminal nature’ of a range of specifically named new religious minority groups that were 
legitimately operating in the country according to the 1990 law (personal archive of Dmitry Dubrovsky). See 
also Emily Baran’s and Zoe Knox’s contributions to this special issue.  
27 James T. Richardson, Galina Krylova and Marat Shterin, “Legal Regulation of Religion in Russia,” in 
Regulating Religion: Case Studies From Around the Globe, ed. James Richardson (New York: Kluwer 
Academic, 2004), 247-59. 
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rights activist Rev. Gleb Yakunin challenged the derogatory portrayal of a range of minority 
religions in a brochure by the key anticult ideologist Alexander Dvorkin.28 The trial became a 
battleground between research-based academic approaches to minority religions, presented 
by a constellation of prominent Western scholars (Eileen Barker, Gordon Melton, James 
Richardson, Bryan Wilson, and others) and anticult views presented by some of its most 
prominent advocates (Thomas Gandow and Johannes Aagaard in particular).  
These cases were early harbingers of the future challenges facing both academic 
experts and the judiciary, namely a combination of epistemological and political pressures to 
present a particular view on unpopular minority groups. The epistemological challenge 
concerns the issue of what constitutes and who decides on the validity of knowledge of these 
groups, which was contested in these cases.29 In the Russian situation, the complexity of 
these issues was compounded by the widespread perception or explicit claims that the 
dominant religious institution, the Russian Orthodox Church, should be the ultimate arbiter 
validating academic knowledge in this area. The solidifying alliance between political elites 
and the Church, in particular during Putin’s presidencies, put political pressure on both 
academic experts and the judiciary.  Analysis of 1990s cases indicates a considerable degree 
of uncertainly among the judiciary about how to tackle the issue of validity among competing 
academic testimonies.30  However, this analysis also revealed that in such cases the judiciary 
almost invariably took the position of representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church as the 
guiding light in resolving their quandary. The epistemological alliance between certain 
academic experts and the judiciary was thus formed, based on the shared assumption that 
viewing minority religions as a potential threat to society and the individual must be taken for 
                                                 
28 Marat Shterin and James T. Richardson, “The Yakunin vs. Dvorkin trial and the Emerging Religious 
Pluralism in Russia,” Religion in Eastern Europe 22, no. 1 (2002) 1-38. 
 
29 Shterin and Richardson, “Yakunin vs. Dworkin Trial.” 
30 Richardson, Krylova and Shterin, “Legal Regulation of Religion.” 
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granted.  Thus, by securitizing religion, in particular minority religions, anti-extremism 
legislation further solidified this alliance.  
 The emergence of the epistemological alliance between the judiciary and academic 
experts did not require direct political pressure, as it reflected broader cultural and social 
trends in post-Soviet Russia.   What has been called a resurgence of Orthodoxy included the 
widespread popular perceptions about the exclusive validity of the nation’s dominant 
religious institution and the increasingly assertive claims of the Church leadership to be 
directly involved in other social institutions, in particular education.   
This leads to the third factor that contributed to shaping the collage of experts on 
minority religions, including those providing legal testimonies on these groups. One 
expression of the increasing institutional impact of the Russian Orthodox Church has been 
the integration of theology into the Russian university system, with little distinction made 
between theology as an academic subject and doctrine and, most consequentially, between 
academic theology and religious studies.31 The situation in Islamic Studies is quite similar.32 
This, in turn, has resulted in the mass production of professionals who claim academic 
expertise in religion on the basis of their doctrinally-based theological education. The 
question of epistemological validity shows itself here again, with secular religious studies 
experts pointing to the problematic nature of doctrinally-based knowledge when it defines 
perspectives on and views of other religions. On the other hand, their “theological” opponents 
have questioned the validity of the secular and empirically based approach of religious 
studies.33 Furthermore, in the eyes of some officials and legal professionals, Russian 
Orthodox and mainstream Islamic clergy have become sui generis experts on religion and a 
                                                 
31 For advocacy of seeing doctrinal theology as proper religious studies, see Aleksei Kozyrev, “Vmesto 
poslesloviia. Religiovedenie – nauka o religiovedakh?,” Religioznaia zhizn’, December 12, 2011, available at 
<http://religious.life/2011/12/kozyirev-vmesto-poslesloviya-religiovedenie-nauka-o-religiovedah/>. 
32 Sergei Ivanenko, “Problemy obosnovannosti i dostovernosti vyvodov religiovedcheskoi ekspertizy,” 
Islamovedenie, no. 4 (2013): 46-55. 
33 Kozyrev, “Vmesto poslesloviia.” 
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substitute for the defunct scientific atheism and its institutions.  On several occasions, in both 
policy and legal decisions, religious studies expertise has been represented by Russian 
Orthodox priests or Islamic clergy.   
The lack of shared academic standards and institutions to uphold them has resulted in 
what can be called the Alexander Dvorkin phenomenon that epitomizes the trends described 
above. Without any relevant academic qualifications or research-based credentials, Dvorkin 
carved out a role for himself as the key academic expert, both in higher education and in legal 
cases involving a range of minority religions.  Drawing almost exclusively on Western 
anticult sources and concepts (e.g. substituting the notion of “destructive cult” with that of 
“totalitarian sect”), Dvorkin has claimed to have created a legitimate academic discipline of 
“Sectarian Studies.”34 While from the beginning funded and hosted by the Russian Orthodox 
Church, Dvorkin’s views have become widely accepted as legitimately academic within the 
Russian legal system, from the Ministry of Justice where he was the founding Chair (2009 – 
2015) and then permanent member of the Expert Council on Religious Expertise, to the law 
courts where his numerous expert testimonies have been invariably admitted.  
 In this situation, dissent from this epistemological consensus against minority 
religions has taken the form of independent associations of religious studies scholars and 
legal professionals, such as the Institute for Religion and Law, the Guild of Experts in 
Religion and Law, the Independent Centre for Religious Studies, and the All-Russian 
Association for Religious Freedom (MARS). These associations have been instrumental in 
engaging academics with relevant qualifications in legal cases involving minority religions.  
 In the current Russian situation, the epistemological alliance between the judiciary 
and academic experts is facilitated by the lack of autonomy of the Russian legal system, in 
particular its judges.  As Ella Paneyakh points out, judges operate within an institutional 
                                                 
34Aleksandr Dvorkin, Sektovedenie. Totalitarnye Sekty. Opyt Sistematicheskogo Issledovaniia, 3rd ed. (Nizhnyi 
Novgorod: Saint Alexander Nevsky Publishing House, 2002). 
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system with a high degree of interdependence between law enforcement agencies and 
prosecutors who, in turn, have a range of bureaucratic mechanisms to control the judiciary.35  
Unconstrained by public scrutiny, judges tend to cooperate with prosecutors, which accounts 
for the accusatory bias in their decision-making (only 0.2 percent of all defendants are 
acquitted in Russia). In this context, anti-extremist legislation only exacerbated a general 
trend by giving extraordinary powers to both law enforcement agencies and prosecutors, and 
by incentivizing their use of power and by providing a broad interpretation of punishable 
offences.  While Paneyakh also notes that in some cases judges have exercised a degree of 
discretion and avoided unnecessarily severe punishment, this is unlikely to apply to litigation 
involving minority religions, as judges tend to share popular misconceptions about them. 
 Finally, for some academics, going against the presumably consensual view about 
unpopular minority groups has come with a considerable social cost.  Thus, in early 2017 a 
well-known Religious Studies scholar Professor Ekaterina Elbakyan became subject of 
highly derogatory media reporting that focused on her expert testimonies for the defense in 
cases involving the Church of Scientology and Jehovah’s Witnesses.36 Almost immediately 
this was followed by termination of her professorial contract with the Russian Academy of 
Industrial and Social Relations.  In August 2018 Alexander Panchenko, prominent Social 
Anthropologist known for his work on religious minorities, lost his professorial position at 
the Faculty of Liberal Arts of St. Petersburg University.37  This happened soon after his 
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expert testimony in an anti-extremism case involving a Pentecostal Church challenged the 
original conclusion provided by the Centre for Forensic Research of the same university. The 
latter conclusion, commissioned by the Counter Extremism Centre of the Ministry of Interior, 
was reached by academics without research-based expertise in Pentecostalism, while 
Panchenko’s view drew on his longitudinal studies of this form of Christianity in Russia and 
beyond.  Irrespective of whether or not university management’s decisions resulted from 
direct political interference, these cases clearly point to the social pressures that can be 
brought to bear on forming the ‘epistemological alliance’ within the academic expert 
community and between academic experts and the judiciary.  
 
Anti-Extremism Legislation and Academic Expertise in Religion  
 
As other scholars note in their contributions to this special issue, one of the key 
effects of anti-extremism legislation has been that it forged a range of conceptual tools to 
construe political dissent and even moral or social non-conformism as political subversion. It 
also created a legal and administrative basis to act according to these constructions.  
Moreover, the vagueness of the definition of extremism leaves considerable room for the 
arbitrary implementation of this legislation, including in relation to minority religions.  This 
has had a range of implications for academic expertise in the cases in question.  
 To begin, the law does not deploy “religious extremism” as a legal term, nor does this 
concept exist elsewhere in the body of Russian law.  Instead the 2002 Law provides a general 
list of loosely defined acts of extremism, including those committed on religious grounds.38 
These acts are included in the Russian penal code as crimes, such as membership in a terrorist 
organization (Art. 205.5), participation in activities of an extremist organizations (Art. 
                                                 
38 Aleksander Verhovsky, “Protivodeistvie religiosnomu extremismu: rossiiskoe gosudarstvo v poiskakh otvetov 
na vyzov desekularizatsii,” Gosudarstvo, Religia i Tserkov’ v Rossii i za rubezhom, no. 2 (2013) available at 
<https://www.sova-center.ru/misuse/publications/2013/08/d27775/#_ftn30>. 
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282.2.2), and hate speech denigrating a group’s dignity (Article 282).  In addition, a religious 
association and its members can be prosecuted for extremism on the grounds of violating the 
1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.  In this sense, the 2002 law 
solidified and legitimized the trend of construing religion as a potential threat to national 
security, which was explicit in a number of earlier high-level political pronouncements and 
documents, such as the 2000 National Security Concept of the Russian Federation.39 In turn, 
these pronouncements and documents juxtaposed “traditional religions” and “Russian 
spirituality” as guarantors of national well-being and, by implication, competition to them 
from “foreign” and “non-traditional” religions as potential threats.  
 This created a situation whereby judiciary had to deliberate and make decisions on 
associations that could legitimately exist in Russia under the Russian Constitution and 1997 
law, but could also be prosecuted and banned according to anti-extremism legislation.  There 
have been two major ways to resolve this dilemma. First, in some cases the judiciary has 
questioned whether a religious association is genuinely religious. Second, the judiciary has 
sometimes investigated if certain activities of an association are incompatible with its 
religious status and present threats to national security, according to the 1997 law, the 
Russian Penal Code, and the 2002 law. Indeed, a 2009 decree of the Russian Ministry of 
Justice requires that experts on religion must: 
1. establish if the association is religious in nature on the basis of its constituent 
documents and the expert’s knowledge of its religious dogmas and practices; 
2. assess the plausibility of the information provided by this association on its 
religious dogmas and practices;   
                                                 
39 The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation was signed into Decree No 24 by President Putin 
on 10 January 2000.  It contains references to the preservation of Russia’s cultural and spiritual legacy as a 
matter of national security, which includes ‘counteraction against the negative influence of foreign religious 
organizations and missionaries.” See, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768 
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3. check and assess the conformity of the actual forms of religious life of the 
association to how they are described in its registration documents.40 
This obligation requires academic experts to answer questions that would be considered 
unanswerable in contemporary academic studies of religion and that can only be addressed 
from either a doctrinal position or by ignoring the religious nature of particular associations.41 
Compounded by the overall rhetoric of anti-extremism legislation and the general political 
context of its implementation, this situation creates difficult dilemmas for academic experts 
testifying on minority religions, unless, of course, their position is a priori biased against 
these groups.   This, in turn, has profound effects on the choice of experts by law courts and 
the quality of expertise in these cases, which can be described as their “punishing bias.”  
 In Russian law, expert opinions count as evidence, carrying the same weight as 
material evidence and testimony by witnesses. However, expert testimony, according to the 
Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, is not subject to full scrutiny in the adversarial process. 
In reality, experts are allowed both to establish facts and draw legal conclusions. One of the 
recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights considers this dynamic a serious 
violation of the legal procedure as stipulated in Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.42  This legal approach to academic expertise has an uncanny resemblance to 
the Soviet treatment of scientific evidence as an expression of indubitable truth and has led to 
a lack of genuine competition among experts in law courts. 
 These trends have resulted in an identifiable profile of experts on religion, deployed 
in Russian law courts. First of all, these experts tend to come from disciplines other than 
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religious studies or related areas (e.g. sociology or anthropology of religion). Instead they 
primarily come from linguistics and psychology, or represent particular theological 
viewpoints, mainly Russian Orthodox and “traditional” Islamic views.  Second, they tend to 
focus on identifying hidden threats to society from minority religions, mostly through 
secularized and reductive interpretations of religious language in order to prove its 
destructive impact.  As a result, experts in linguistics and psychology tend to ignore specific 
religious meanings, or hermeneutics, in religious texts and discourses. For example, 
believers’ claims to exclusive truth are typically represented as illegal assertions of 
superiority, their criticism of other religions or non-believers as hate speech, and expressions 
of religious belonging as attempts at social separatism and discrimination against other 
“social groups.”  Finally, these experts tend to assume the validity of the distinction between 
“traditional” and “non-traditional” religions, with the implications of their respective 
acceptability and tendency for extremism.   
 This approach is well articulated by Marina Gradusova, secretary of the Altai 
Regional Committee for Combatting Extremism. In her analysis of expertise on religion in 
anti-extremism litigation, Gradusova identifies specific articles of the Russian Criminal 
Code, which, in her view, require specialized knowledge of religious studies:  Art. 282 
(“incitement of hatred or enmity and abasement of human dignity”) and Art. 148 
(“obstruction of the exercise of the right to the freedom of conscience and freedom of 
religion”).  Interestingly, when referring to expertise in religion in connection to the articles 
on terrorism, the author specifically points to the need for a knowledge of Islam and 
emphasizes the counter-extremism activities of the Russian state. The author concludes that 
the goal of the religious studies expert in litigation of this kind is to clearly identify signs of 
extremism in behavior, speeches, and “special words” in what she already assumes to be 
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extremist literature and activities propagating the worldview of a particular extremist 
organization.43 
 At the same time, the selection of experts by courts is not necessarily based on a 
requirement for a specialised knowledge, validated by relevant professional associations.  
The Russian legal system does not apply the equivalent of a Frye or Daubert test in the U.S. 
legal system, whereby an expert opinion on specific issues is supposed to be consistent with 
the methodological and theoretical standards accepted within professional academic 
associations.44 Furthermore, Russian courts tend to select experts who are known for their 
opposition on religious grounds to the defendant in the legal case.  In addition to the example 
of Dvorkin mentioned above, Russian courts have deployed expertise from Timur 
Urazmetov, who served as an academic expert in several anti-extremist trials of Hizb  
ut-Tahrir, including in Ufa in 2016.45 In fact, Urazmetov has academic qualifications in 
European medieval family law and has no scholarly credentials in the study of Islam in 
general and Hizb ut -Tahrir in particular.  
On the other hand, in several anti-extremist litigations Russian courts have rejected 
the expertise of religious studies scholars on the grounds that they did not have relevant 
knowledge. Thus, in its decision to ban Islamic scholar Said Nursi’s literature, Koptev 
District Court dismissed the testimony from Sergei Mezentsev who had a PhD in Philosophy 
with special reference to Religious Studies and who came out against the ban. In a 
remarkable throwback to the Soviet-style secularist reductionism, the court justified its 
decision as follows: 
                                                 
43 M. Gradusova, “ Religiovedtcheskiie aspekty sudebnoy expertizy po delam of extremizme,” Lingva-Expert, 
June 29, 2016, <http://lingva-expert.ru/articles/Religiovedcheskaya-ekspertiza-ekstremizm/?sphrase_id=6>.  
44 James T. Richardson and Gerald Ginsburg, “A Critique of ‘Brainwashing’ Evidence in Light of Daubert: 
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45 T. Z. Urazmetov, Iu. V. Osheeva, Iu. S. Fomina and E. E. Khazimullina, “Expert conclusion no. 53, case no.  
2016427012,” 2016 (Dmitry Dubrovsky’s personal archive).  
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The Court does not accept the testimony from this witness because, in the Court’s 
opinion, the question about the extremist character of the books from the collection of 
works “Risali-I Nur” by Said Nursi requires specialist knowledge in the disciplines of 
social psychology, linguistics and psycholinguistics, i.e. specialists [are required] with 
competence in investigating meaning of literary texts, mass communications and 
propaganda of relationships [sic], linguistic behavior, and their influence on social 
consciousness.  S. D. Mezentsev does not have this knowledge.46  
 
Anti-Extremism Cases Involving New Islamic Groups 
 
Legal cases involving Islamic minority groups are particularly revealing, as some of 
these groups are known for, or popularly represented as, radical and extremist, which in the 
Russian public discourse, implies the propensity for or actual involvement in terrorism. This 
highly unfavorable and threatening image has been publicly validated by the pronouncements 
of some academic experts, such as Roman Silantiev and Rais Suleymenov, who routinely 
present all non-traditional groups as “Wahhabi extremists.”47  In addition, whenever a new 
Islamic group shows the propensity to comment on current affairs or elaborates a religiously 
inspired political ideology, it becomes vulnerable to the reductionist approach of experts with 
backgrounds in linguistics and psychology, who tend to treat these pronouncements as direct 
calls for extremist actions. On the other hand, more nuanced and or even alternative views by 
other academic experts, such as Akhmet Yarlykapov, Vladimir Bobrovnikov, and Alexei 
Malashenko, are rarely represented in Russian courts.  
                                                 
46 Cited in Vitalii Ponomarev, Rossiyskie spetsluzhby protiv ‘Risale-i Nur’: 2001-2012  (Moscow: Memorial, 
2012), 146. 
47 On Russian experts in Islam, including Roman Silantyev and Rais Suleymenov, see Kristina Kovalskaya, 
“Nationalism and Religion in the Discourse of Russia’s ‘Critical Experts of Islam’”, Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations, no 28/2 (2017): 141-161 
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 Hizb ut-Tahrir is a particularly telling example of these trends.  In some sense, it is a 
classical radical Islamist movement whose main declared goal is the return to the caliphate as 
an ideal universal polity for all Muslims. Its literature is awash with impassioned invectives 
against kuffar (unbelievers), Jews and Christians, and various ethnic groups, as well as 
against those treacherous Muslim rulers who pursue secular policies or collaborate with non-
Muslim governments.  The movement sees Western liberal democracy and the religious 
pluralism that accompanies it as ungodly.48   
 However, academic experts and security analysts on the movement have pointed out 
that it does not condone terrorism as a means of achieving its ideal theocratic state and 
violence can be justified only in very specific circumstances, mainly in defence of Muslims 
under attack.49 Significantly, according to Hizb’s concept of majal, its aim of restoring the 
caliphate can only be achieved in Islam’s historic Arab lands and cannot be pursued 
simultaneously in several countries and certainly not in Muslim-minority countries; thus the 
idea of global violent jihad for the caliphate is unequivocally rejected.50  Violence is only 
justified in cases of rebellion by Muslims against unjust and anti-Islamic leaders in Muslim-
majority states.  
 Despite this and the objections of some Russian human rights organisations and 
experts on hate speech and extremism, in particular Aleksandr Verkhovskii, in 2003 the 
Russian Supreme Court declared Hizb a terrorist organisation and banned it.51  This decision 
immediately triggered a number of legal prosecutions and arrests on the grounds of belonging 
                                                 
48 See Victoria Koroteyeva, “Hizb ut-Tahrir in Russian Courts: Radical Islamism as Ideology and Crime”, paper 
presented at the conference Islam in Russia at the Davis Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies of Harvard 
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50 Ponomarev, Rossiia, 3, and Koroteyeva, “Hizb ut-Tahrir.” 
51 Ponomarev, Rossiia, and Aleksandr Verkhovskii, “Iavliaet’sia li Hizb ut-Tahrir ekstremistskoi 
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Aleksandr Verkhovskii (Moscow: Sova Center, 2005). 
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to a terrorist organisation, which still continues today, most frequently in the Muslim-
majority republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, but also in the rest of the country, 
including Moscow, Cheliabinsk and Stavropol in European Russia and Nizhnevartovsk in 
Siberia.52  In addition, since 2007 membership in Hizb incurres charges of attempted violent 
overthrow of the constitutional order (Art. 278), which deprives the defendants of the right to 
a trial by jury.53  
In the legal trials of Hizb’s members (or sometimes alleged members), academic 
experts gain access to evidential material, from the movement’s publications in print and on 
the Internet to videotapes, audio recordings of conversations, and personal diaries, 
confiscated during the members’ homes raids by police and security forces.54  While, in 
theory, this material allows for a nuanced and sophisticated analysis of the movement’s and 
its members’ actual views and actions, academic experts tend to use it selectively, looking for 
proofs of terrorist intent and subversive activities against the Russian state.  Despite forensic 
analysis not being one of their tasks, these experts tend to use quasi-logical conjecture in 
place of detailed consideration of actual beliefs, actions, and the relationship between them. 
For example, they emphasise, with full certainty, that Hizb’s aim is to restore the Caliphate, 
but ignore the principle of majal and non-violence in publications by Russian members, such 
as the “Answer to Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki ” that defends this principle in relation to 
Russia.55  
The experts further interpret the idea of caliphate as the intent to violently overthrow 
the Russian state, in particular in Muslim-majority regions of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and 
Dagestan. In that light, discussions among and speculations by the criminal defendants are 
interpreted by the experts and the judiciary as established facts relating to actions. This 
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54 Ponomarev, Rossiia, and Koroteyeva, “Hizb ut-Tahrir.” 
55Abdul’ Aziz, “Otvet sheikhu Anvaru Al’Avlaki-raz’’iasnenie o shariatskom pravile metoda vosstanovleniia 
Khalifata,” Halifat-Info, January 10, 2010, <http://halifat.info/fikra/clarifications/403-otvet-4eihu.html>.  
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tendency becomes particularly evident when experts refer to political conversations among 
members or within splinter groups about the possibilities of violent actions, such as a popular 
uprising or military coup, as a way to come to power in Muslim-majority countries.56 Such 
conversations are typically presented as evidence of preparation for terrorist acts and 
subversive anti-state actions. Koroteyeva provides an example of such quasi-logical 
conjecture typically used by the experts:  
 
A future Islamic state, as the sole sovereign entity in the world, would necessarily 
include Russia, thereby attacking its constitutional order. The Russian state would 
certainly resist a Muslim, theocratic state on its territory. Jihad would require 
confrontation with the Russian state, even if Hizb abjures violence before the 
Caliphate’s establishment.57 
 
In many cases, academic experts deploy even simpler logic in identifying signs of 
extremism in Hizb’s publications. One expert conclusion for a Hizb trial in 2006 in Kazan’ 
pointed to the “non-traditionalist” nature of the movement’s beliefs as an indicator of its 
extremism, and to its rhetoric of exclusivity and rejection of non-Muslims and “wrong” 
Muslims as evidence of “hate speech.” In the analysis of the Hizb magazine Al-Way (now 
prohibited in the Russian Federation), three experts for the trial (a linguist, philosopher and 
psychologist) concluded that the text in question had clear indications of extremism, as it 
showed “the ability of people, organized on the basis of their religion, to engage in a 
collective action to promote religious interests” and to propagate “opposition between 
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57 Koroteyeva, “Hizb ut-Tahrir.” 
 25 
Muslims and non-Muslims and antagonism between Islam and other religions and 
ideologies.”58  
 In the trial of Hizb members in the Crimean city of Yalta, a group of three linguists 
and one religious studies scholar from the Ufa State Pedagogic University were asked the 
question: “Is there direct or indirect evidence of extremism in the information under 
investigation of Hizb ut-Tahrir’ activity?”59 The information under investigation was supplied 
by the FSB and consisted of transcripts of audio recordings, with specific highlighted parts 
where the experts were supposed to identify the signs of extremism in the defendants’ 
“linguistic behavior.” In reality, one goal the experts set for themselves was to identify 
evidence of Hizb’s presence in the conversations among the defendants, including references 
to specific publications that were presumed to be extremist. Another goal pursued by the 
experts was to analyse the “communicative strategy of speakers,” from which they concluded 
that the analysed conversations revealed the existence of a particular social structure that was 
characteristic of that of an “extremist organization.”  
 The same approach and practice appears in expert testimonies on the Islamist 
organization that was referred to as Hurjular and that has been banned on the grounds of 
extremist activities. In fact, this organisation remains unknown to any scholar of Islam in 
Russia or elsewhere. Most likely it was invented by the FSB, possibly through 
misinterpretation of communications among followers of Nursi. This “organisation” is a good 
example of how experts’ methodology can result in the production of evidence on extremism 
even of nonexistent entities.60  Thus, in a 2014 trial of alleged Nurjular members in Nizhni 
Novgorod, three scholars of religious studies, linguistics and psychology from a local 
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university were asked to make a determination on the following question: “Are these persons 
members of international religious organization Nurjular, which is banned in Russia? Has this 
organization ever been registered as a religious organization anywhere?”61  Their conclusion 
was affirmative, despite the complete lack of references to this organization in the literature 
and audio-recordings supplied to the experts by the security services.  Rather, they used a 
semi-logical conjecture to conclude that the absence of such references was the proof of a 
deep conspiracy among the defendants who had to protect themselves against possible 
prosecution by the security services.62 In an earlier (2008) trial in Krasnoyarsk, academic 
experts used a different kind of conjecture, claiming that Nursi texts insulted “non-religious 
people” and indirectly propagated violence by expressing negative attitudes toward non-
Islamic people and cultures. Nursi’s injunction, “Dignity and decency have to put in place 
uncultured infidels” was referred to as proof of his “social aggression against non-Muslims.” 
In a further, psychological conjecture, the experts concluded that this “textual construction” 
will most likely negatively influence the reader, who would feel compelled to see unbelievers 
as criminals and use violence against them.63 
 Finally, this methodology has been used in the recent (2018) trial of members of 
Tablighi Jamaat.64  The “complex ethnical – religious-sociological-political” (sic) expertise 
for the court, produced by Roman Silantyev, expert in Islamic Studies, and Alexander 
Savvin, a theologian, asserted that Tablighi’s ideology was rooted in the  “extremism of 
Wahhabi-Deobandi thought, which was the prototype of current Islamic extremism.”  
Apparently based on recorded meetings, the experts concluded that the defendants were 
Tablighi members, as they wore specific white clothes of “Pakistani style,” and used 
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62 Dorofeev, Volkov, and Koltunova, “Ekspertnoe zakliuchenie,” 5. 
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characteristic words, like “zikr.”  In addition, the experts presumed that the references to 
jihadi acquaintances, which appeared in the recordings, also pointed to the defendants’ 
membership in the extremist organization Tablighi Jamaat.65 
 Finally, associating acceptable behavior and actions with allegiance to traditional 
religions and their institutionally defined norms while treating deviations from them as 
extremism constitutes another basis for using conjecture in expert conclusions.  It is quite 
common for Russian religious studies experts in counter-extremism litigation to identify 
extremism through juxtaposing normative prescriptions of traditional Islam and “illegitimate” 
theological deviance by newer Islamic groups. Thus, in response to a request from the 
Special Counter-Extremism division of the Interior Ministry, the scholar Ramil’ Adygamov 
from the Russian Islamic University in Kazan’ concluded that the recordings of a lecture he 
was asked to investigate show that the lecturer’s views “do not fully fit the traditional Islam 
of the Muslims of Volga-Ural region” and contain “criticism of the Sufi School” from the 
viewpoint of Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (reputed to be the founders 
of Wahhabism).  He concludes that this non-traditional version of Islam is extremist and will 
likely to have alienating effects on local Muslims.66  This is a clear example of an academic 
expert’s seeing his role as comparing non-traditional and traditional versions of Islam, and 
defending the latter.  
 
Anti-Extremism Litigation Involving Other Religious Minorities 
 
The approaches to and practice of academic expertise in anti-extremist litigation have 
also manifested themselves in a range of cases involving minority groups known as 
                                                 
65 “Ot propovedi do ‘Al’ Kaidy.’ Pochemu v Rossii presleduiut aktivistov musul’manskogo dvizheniia ‘Tabligi 
Dzhamaat.’” Zona Mediia, June 6, 2018, <https://zona.media/article/2018/07/06/tabligi>.  




totalitarian sects among anticult and anti-sectarian activists. Jehovah’s Witnesses stand out as 
a particularly salient target of the anti-extremist prosecution in Russia, for the reasons well-
articulated in Emily Baran’s and Zoe Knox’s contributions to this issue.  While Baran and 
Knox provide the broader exploration of these cases, this article focuses its discussion on the 
academic expertise involved in them.  
 The Jehovah’s Witnesses’ strong emphasis on exclusive religious truth and strict 
prohibition of certain civic and medical practices and activities, such as expressions of 
allegiance to the state, carrying arms, and blood transfusion, makes them particularly 
vulnerable to the dominant tendency among Russian academic experts to bracket 
sectarianism and non-traditionalism with extremism. As early as a 1999 Moscow trial, a 
panel of experts concluded that Witness’ religious literature contained conspicuous hate 
speech and violated citizens’ rights and freedoms, including the “right for medical help and 
leisure time.”  Significantly, among the five experts on that panel there was only one 
religious studies scholar, and he was the only one who refused to sign the conclusion.67 
Anticipating (or, to some extent, precipitating) the philosophy of anti-extremist legislation, 
this conclusion claimed that as behavioral and ethical norms are defined by traditional 
religions, adherence to Jehovah’s Witnesses belief system leads to its members’ social and 
moral disorientation and deviance.  
The introduction of anti-extremism legislation provided both incentives and legal 
tools for state prosecutors and law courts to deploy this kind of expertise. The decision of the 
Taganrog City Court to ban the Witnesses local organization and their literature, which was 
confirmed by Russia’s Supreme Court in December 2009, was based on the expert 
conclusion of the Rostov Center For Forensic Expertise, which included linguist Tatiana 
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Kasyanyuk, psychologist Sergiei Shipshin, and philosopher Sergei Astapov. They found 
elements of extremism in Witness’ beliefs, practices, and publications, claiming that the 
group endangers the lives of its members by prohibiting blood transfusion, propagating 
superiority over other religions and their adherents by insisting on exclusivity of its truth, and 
causing alienation of its members from other religions “by denying the immortality of the 
soul” and “inciting hatred to the entire Christian world.” The conclusion also claimed that the 
group propagates negative attitudes toward “social groups” such as governments, ordinary 
people, and priests.68 These and other conclusions had created a foundation for the eventual 
ban (‘liquidation’) on the Russia-wide organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses in 2017, 
discussed in Baran’s and Knox’s contributions to this special issue.  
 Academic expertise took a similar approach in legal cases involving the Church of 
Scientology in Russia.  In the seminal case against this group in the Siberian city of Surgut, 
academic experts concluded that books by church founder L. Ron Hubbard represented an 
“anti-social manifesto, propagating humiliation and hatred towards homo sapience [sic] and 
any social system in general, and especially toward those who are making critical statements 
about Scientology.”69 This was followed by a trial in 2011 in St. Petersburg where experts 
have found dissemination of hatred against ‘the social group of psychiatrists’ in L. Ron 
Hubbard’s anti-psychiatry writings.  On this basis, the city Prosecutor’s Office demanded that 
these publications be included in the list extremist publications banned in the Russian 
Federation.70 In a rare act of defiance of the prosecutor's view, after a year of deliberation, the 
judge dismissed the case, as its absurdity became apparent.  However, in June 2018 another 
case was brought, based on conclusions from experts from the City Prosecutor’s office and 
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special Counter-Extremism Department of the Ministry of Interior, in which a group of 
Scientologists was accused of extremist activities, hate speech, and money laundering. One of 
the grounds for prosecution, cited by the experts, was that the Church allegedly disseminated 
hatred to the “social group of trouble-makers” or “potential trouble-makers,” pointing out that 
the 2002 Law includes dissemination of hatred to particular social groups in the list of 
extremist activities.71 
 Finally, a somewhat curious case of using the anti-extremist legislation to outlaw 
literature by an undesirable minority group was the attempt, in 2011, in the Western Siberian 
city of Tomsk, to ban the Bhagavad Gita, the sacred book for many Hindus, in particular 
followers of the Hare Krishna movement.72 Local academic experts, including Dean of the 
Department of Philosophy at Tomsk State University, had agreed with the city prosecutor 
that this ancient text included passages that are “extremist in nature,” propagated superiority 
of Krishna devotees, and were humiliating to other religions. Dvorkin, the leading Russian 
expert on sectarianism, visited Tomsk and made a passionate speech at the local university. 
However, the case was met with unexpectedly strong resistance from a coalition of local 
oriental studies scholars, other academic experts and, significantly, a coalition of local 
minority religious leaders who came out in defense of the Krishnas.73  In a further move, the 
Indian Embassy in Moscow issued a note protesting the ban on a sacred Hindu text.  Soon 
after the judge dismissed the case, thus demonstrating that mobilization of academic and 
public opinion, combined with political pressure, can occasionally outweigh the Russian legal 
system’s bias against minority groups and its propensity to rely on anti-sectarian experts.  
 
Conclusion 
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By examining the relationship between academic experts and Russia’s judicial system 
in regulating religion, this article has revealed a significant aspect of ‘judicalization of 
politics and religion’, which can be observed across the globe. In particular, it charted the 
politico-epistemological alliance between law courts and academic experts in anti-extremist 
litigation involving minority religions in Russia.  This alliance shows itself in the way both 
courts and academic experts look for evidence of the defendants’ extremism. It is facilitated 
by the status of the academic expert in Russian courts, who is seen as providing 
incontrovertible evidence that cannot be subject to further scrutiny. Their views are 
conclusions rather than testimonies that could be countered by other testimonies in an 
adversarial process; therefore, the facts they provide directly lead to legal conclusions.  In 
fact, the line between offering facts and making legal conclusions tends to be blurred in many 
statements by experts, and in the very questions that they are asked to address.  Finally, the 
experts can get away with making their conclusions through conjecture rather than the 
validity and reliability of their evidence not only because of their monopoly on telling the 
truth to the courts, but also because their narratives are consistent with the overall discourses 
that underpin political power.  
 Focusing on minority religions brings into sharp relief broader issues in the operation 
of a legal system that lacks autonomy and is marked by interdependence between law 
enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and the judiciary.  Equally important, this analysis reveals 
how the lack of proper validation of knowledge in humanities and social sciences contributes 
to the production of experts prepared to form the epistemological alliance with a biased 
judiciary and to legitimize discriminatory decisions. Anti-extremism legislation further 
exacerbates this situation by facilitating the political use of the legal system for managing 
dissent.  
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